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 A conflict ignited just over ten years ago on September 11, 2001 in the heart of 
New York City has since shifted from its origin to Afghanistan, Pakistan and now 
Yemen.  Though the terrorist organization that perpetrated the act was al-Qaeda the 
United States (U.S.) escalated the conflict even further and declared a “War on Terror” 
intending to eliminate terrorism as a viable option for insurgency by organizations and 
claiming the use of terror as sufficient cause for retaliation.  “Terrorism” will here be 
defined according to the U.S. Department of State’s definition, “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, and is usually intended to influence an audience.”
1
   
 In combatting terrorism the U.S. has a number of tactics in its arsenal including, 
but not limited to: full-scale military invasion, surgical military operations, nation 
building, diplomacy, etc.  When fighting a terrorist organization that takes haven within a 
sovereign nation it is necessary to engage in diplomatic tools and negotiations to work in 
conjunction with this nation in order to reach a mutually beneficial solution to 
eliminating the terrorist threat.  A tried and true tool used by the U.S. is the use of 
economic incentives to stabilize a state government and encourage them to pursue the 
elimination of specific terrorist targets.  Especially in the last decade has this tool become 
more evident and it has evolved as it has gained usage. The methods and successes seen 
via economic incentives in Yemen are not the same as are seen in Afghanistan or 
Pakistan.   
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 There is debate as to what the most effective method to combat terrorism is, 
whether it should be eliminated strategically one hard target at a time or whether it 
requires a social and economic change at a basic level.  Karin von Hippel posits that a 
solution should fall further into the second category than the first.  She refers to poverty 
as an enabling factor, noting that “by providing the poor with social services, a number of 
national focused Islamist groups and political parties, and the al-Qaeda movement more 
generally, have been able to significantly broaden their appeal.”
2
  In this case, 
strengthening the national government’s institutions and ability to provide these types of 
social services will eliminate at least one contributing factor in the spread of terrorist 
recruitment.   
 The Republic of Yemen has a unique and especially fragmented political and 
social situation.  The country is formed from two separate modern states, the People’s 
Democratic Republic in southern Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic in the north.
3
  
The two unified in 1990 under the North’s leader, President Saleh.
4
  After a civil war in 
1994 fought over politics between political parties there was a lot of political strife and 
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separation remaining in the country.
5
  President Saleh remained in office for the next 
decade and a half, winning both the 1999 and 2006 presidential elections.
6
   
 Ongoing factionalism within the country is found in the al-Houthi rebellion in the 
north, the southern secessionist movement and the presence of al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist organizations’ operatives.
7
  Beyond these political and social ills the nation faces 
crippling poverty with 53% of the population impoverished according to the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index.
8
  The nation has few natural resources or industries to 
speak of; oil makes up one-third of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but is expected to run 
dry in the next decade.  Yemen is currently facing a water shortage crisis with the 
possibility of completely depleting urban aquifers in the next two decades and an 
increasingly arid climate shows no promise for improvement.  There is a real possibility 
that without aid Yemen could be the first environmentally failed state
9
   
 In the midst of such instability the Arab Spring spread to Yemen in early 2011 
leading to protests and demonstrations against then President Saleh.  Attempts to 
maintain order and suppress the public outcry frequently turned violent resulting in more 
than 2,000 deaths.
10
  In November 2011 Saleh agreed to step down and accepted the Gulf 
Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Transition Initiative.  In February 2012, in exchange for 
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immunity for himself and his allies from any crimes they may have committed for 
political purposes, Saleh stepped down as President of Yemen to become President of the 
General People’s Congress Party.  Elections were held in February with only one 
candidate on the ballot, per the GCC’s Transition Initiative, Saleh’s Vice President Abed 
Rabbo Mansour al Hadi.
11
   
 The increasing presence of al-Qaeda in Yemen has observers worried about what 
a collapse in the Yemeni government would mean for terrorism.  This would open a 
power vacuum within the country that would incite such a struggle that al-Qaeda would 
have ample opportunity to further secure their stronghold in the country.  It would also 
deprive the U.S. of a partner in battling al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  As 
such, the U.S. worked with the GCC to draft the Transition Initiative to ensure a smooth 
leadership transition.
12
   
The U.S. has been a heavy provider of economic and security related aid over the 
course of the last few years in attempts to fill in some of the gaps in governance.  
Between 2007 and 2012 the U.S. allocated $72 million through the Economic Support 
Fund (ESF), $52 million through Development Assistance (DA), $29 million in Global 
Health Child Survival (GHCS), and $37 million in Food for Peace via the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).
13
    
USAID has a strategy aimed at increasing Yemen’s “stability through targeted 
interventions in vulnerable areas.”
14
  Its objectives include improving community 
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livelihoods and improving governance in order to “mitigate drivers of instability.”
15
  
These “drivers” are defined as a large population growth, unequal development, political 
disaffection, corruption, weak governance, diminishing natural resources and “violent 
Islamist extremism.”
16
  USAID defends this strategy as addressing some of the root 
causes that turn people to extremism.  By providing citizens with necessary social 
services at a local level through their elected leaders and government they will build trust 
in government institutions, improve the economic and social conditions of the 




Similar tactics have been used in Afghanistan and Pakistan with differing results. 
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16 Ibid. p. 1. 
17 Ibid. p. 2. 
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Case Study: Afghanistan  
 
 Afghanistan has been the focus of the War on Terror since the infamous 9/11 
attacks perpetrated by the terrorist organization al-Qaeda.  Once the Taliban had been 
driven from the capital and legitimate governance in Operation Enduring Freedom the 
U.S., and other world powers, desired to establish a stable and democratic form of 
government that would prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorism 
and al-Qaeda again.  The Bonn Agreement was signed by major factions in Afghan 
politics, excluding the Taliban, on December 5, 2001 establishing a basis for a new 
Afghan government, with the full support of the United Nations (UN).
18
   
 This government has since modified its Constitution, and navigated two election 
cycles resulting in a second term President Hamid Karzai and a lot of political contention.  
This contention, along with a fragile economy, a weak government and lack of control 
over its own territory have led to U.S. concerns over the stability of the country as it 
withdraws its military presence from the country.  The political contention began around 
the 2009 Presidential elections.  There was only 35% voter participation, demonstrating 
remaining Taliban influence in the nation through their intimidation of voters, and there 
were widespread allegations of election fraud.  These allegations turned out to be true for 
the incumbent, Karzai, and the contender, Abdullah, as determined by the Elections 
Complaint Committee (ECC). The ECC also confirmed, after fraudulent votes had been 
deducted that Karzai had won the election.  The confirmed electoral fraud weakened 
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 At the beginning of the 2010 Parliamentary elections Karzai overrode a 2005 
election law with a decree that violated the Constitutional requirement that such changes 
be made a year prior to the date of elections.
20
  Again, the election was at least partially 
fraudulent and this led to political unrest in the losing party who felt they were cheated.  
Due to investigations into the fraud the new Parliament’s inauguration was officially 
postponed for nearly a year, leading to threats of impeachment of Karzai and unofficial 
meetings of the unconfirmed members of Parliament.  Ultimately nine members victories 
were declared invalid and they were stripped of their seats, resulting in a mass boycott of 
Parliament by about seventy of its members that did not end until October 2011.
21
 
 With the Taliban still maintain enough influence within Afghanistan to affect 
voter turnout through intimidation it is clear the Afghan government still does not possess 
control over its territories.  With the availability and openness of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border insurgents and terrorists can slip from one country to the next when and 
if Afghan forces get too close.  In 2008 the Taliban moved closer to the capital and 
committed a series of high-profile attacks within Kabul itself.
22
  To increase the 
imbalance in the situation, negotiations over the final size of the Afghanistan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) is currently being haggled over with potential cuts being made to 
a size of 230,000 members from 352,000.  Afghanistan’s Defense Minister Wardak 
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claims the 230,000 target would be “too low to accomplish the security mission.”
23
  
Others claim that any force larger than that would be too costly to support.
24
 
 Afghanistan’s ability to exclusively fund its own security forces any time soon is 
doubtful as its economy has yet to recover from ongoing war and violence.  These wars 
and pattern of violence have decimated Afghanistan’s young and male population and 
there are presently more than 3.5 million refugees displaced within the country.
25
  The 
nation has few strong industries and 90% of its budget is a result of foreign aid.
26
  
According to the World Bank, in a nation with a population of 34.4 million people 36% 
of them are in poverty.
27
 
 Between 2001 and 2010 the U.S. gave $52 billion in aid in order to stabilize 
Afghanistan to “blunt popular support for extremist forces.”
28
  $11 billion of this was 
spent via the Economic Support Fund (ESF), $887 million via Development Assistance 
(DA), $487 million via Global Health/Child Survival (GCHS), $553 million via Refugee 
Accounts, $979 million via Food Aid, and $346 million via International Disaster 
Assistance (IDA).
29
  These funds go towards projects like the National Solidarity 
Program (NSP), which is intended to improve “local ties to the central government.”
30
  
The NSP has mostly been used in local infrastructure build up, resulting in improved 
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community organization.  Specifically targeting domestic economic growth from within 
USAID works towards legal reform, including taxation, and creating business 
associations to promote growth in local businesses.
31
   
 In 2010 additional funds were requested, roughly $2.6 billion for the Afghan 
Security Forces Fund (ASFF).  This went towards objectives like alternative development 
for poppy fields, strengthening Afghan government agencies, and tax reform.
32
  This 
request was approved after roughly $300 million in reductions from the request.
 33
    In 
order to maintain some oversight and control of the ultimate use of these funds Congress 
attached a few conditions.  The ESF account had $200 million withheld from the 2010 
budget until it was certified that the Afghan government was “cooperating fully with U.S. 
efforts against the Taliban and Al Qaeda…”
34
 
 Early in May 2012 while in Afghanistan President Obama commented that “the 
goal I set – to defeat al-Qaeda, and deny it a chance to rebuild – is within reach.”
35
  He 
also expressed his confidence in Afghan security forces and the Taliban’s weakness as 
well, while there to sign an agreement over the U.S. role after it recedes from a combat 
position in 2014.
36
   
 Obama claims the battle is nearly won, but that the U.S. presence will be 
necessary to continue the fight in a limited capacity for some time yet to come.  The 
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economic figures are not encouraging at this time; they show a nation almost completely 
propped up by outside support.  The Afghan government is rife with corruption and does 
not possess the trust of its constituents.  It is hard to say at this point whether it is the 
economic incentives that are responsible in any part for the retreat of the Taliban and al-
Qaeda or the U.S. military presence.  Even if the economic incentives in this case do play 
a part it will be nearly impossible for donor support to prop up the Afghan economy to 
such an extent for long.  Unless the incentives gain new progress in developing nascent 
national industries and government stability it does not seem there will be much success 




Case Study: Pakistan 
 
 Pakistan is one of the top strongholds for al-Qaeda.  Its mountainous and rural 
Northwestern Frontier Province provides ideal cover for al-Qaeda operatives to seek 
cover and refuge when fleeing United States’ forces in Afghanistan.  Even should 
Pakistan indicate a strong desire to run these operatives out, they lack control of this 
region, making it extremely difficult to do so.  The United States has found drones to be 
an effective solution, but this infringes on Pakistan’s sovereignty, something they do not 
take lightly.   
 Pakistan has been a U.S. partner in fighting al-Qaeda since 2001 after the 9/11 
attacks, though the relationship has been anything but smooth.  Most recently the two 
nations have disagreed over the unilateral move by the U.S. to assassinate Osama bin 
Laden and a U.S. drone attack in November 2011, which resulted in the deaths of twenty-
five Pakistani troops.
37
  Pakistan called both of these events “an attack on Pakistan’s 
sovereignty” and responded to the November occurrence by closing its borders to all 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply troops. 
38
 This impasse has still not 
been resolved, though negotiations have been ongoing for months.   
  Despite their differences the U.S. and Pakistan have been allies since the 
country’s inception.  There have been periods where ties were cut, but thus far they have 
always been reestablished when common interests are at stake.  The latest era of U.S.-
                                                        
37 Stephen D. Krasner. "Talking Tough to Pakistan." Foreign Affairs. Jan./Feb. 2012. 
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Pakistani cooperation began in 2001 to combat terrorism after a three-year hiatus from 
1998 when Pakistan tested its nuclear weapon.  In order to secure Pakistan’s compliance 
with anti-terror campaigns the U.S. has provided large monetary packages intended for 
both economic and military use.  The U.S. has provided $22 billion in aid between the 
years 2001 and 2011.  Of this, $14.6 billion was security-related and $7.5 billion 
economic-related.
39
   
 The economic-related aid was distributed under multiple headings: GHCS, DA, 
ESF, Food Aid, Human Rights and Democracy Funds (HRDF), IDA, Migration and 
Refugee Assistance (MRA). The sources of such are the U.S. Departments of State and 
Agriculture and USAID.
40
  In 2009 Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with 
Pakistan Act (EPPA), intended to provide Pakistan with additional economic and security 
assistance to stabilize them as an effective regional partner. Sec 301 of EPPA requires the 
Secretary of State to draft a Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report to be submitted to 
Congress.
 41
   
 The Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report was delivered in December 2009 
outlining three key objectives to “achieve an enhanced partnership.”   
1. “Improve the Government of Pakistan’s capacity to address the country’s most 
critical infrastructure needs.” 
2. “Help the Pakistani government address basic needs and provide improved 
economic opportunities in areas most vulnerable to extremism.” 
                                                        
39 K. Alan Kronstadt. “Pakistan-US Relations: A Summary.” Congressional Research 
Service. 21 Oct. 2011. p. 38.  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41832.pdf.  
40 Ibid. 
41 S. 1707. 111th Cong. (2009). 
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The purpose of these key objectives is to “bring stability and prosperity to Pakistan” in 
order to further U.S. objectives in the region through stabilizing Pakistan economically 
and politically while engendering more public support for U.S. efforts in the region.
43
  
This is necessary for a number of reasons. Primarily, Pakistan suffers from political and 
economic instability, and its people dislike the U.S. presence in the region.   
Current President Zardari had only an 11% approval rating from the public as of 
May 2011, while opposition figures held approval ratings over 50%.
44
  In addition, over 
the course of the last few years there has been significant instability within Parliament.  
The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) became the ruling party in 2008, but rules through an 
unstable coalition.  “Jamaat Ulema Islami (JUI), a small but influential Islamist party,” 
backed out of the coalition late 2010.  Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) has either 
left or threatened to leave the coalition multiple times throughout 2011 due to 
disagreements over “fuel prices, inflation and perceived government mismanagement.”
45
   
One of the few things the Pakistani public seems to be largely united on is their 
disapproval of U.S. tactics and presence.  In 2009, 52% of Pakistanis opposed EPPA, and 
only 15% approved.
46
  In 2011, 82% of Pakistanis aware of U.S. military action to 
assassinate Osama bin Laden disapproved and 13% approved. Though the major issue in 
                                                        
42 U.S. Department of State. Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report. 14 Dec. 2009. p. 2-3 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/134114.pdf . 
43 Ibid. 
44 Kronstadt. “Pakistan-US Relations.” p. 33. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Gilani Research Foundation. “Perceptions on Kerry-Lugar Bill: Gilani Poll/Gallup 
Pakistan.” Gallup Pakistan. 14 Oct. 2009.  http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/14-10-
09.pdf. 
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this situation appeared to have been the perceived violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty as 
85% of those aware disliked that it was done without Pakistan’s government’s knowledge 
and only 29% felt that bin Laden should have been neither captured nor killed.
 47
   
In trying to overcome a dissenting public and a low approval rating of the 
incumbent leader it is necessary to address economic problems contributing to the 
disgruntlement of the public.  Pakistan suffers from high inflation, unemployment, and 
food and energy shortages.  A flood in 2010 further damaged an economy already in 
decline from the global recession.  These factors along with “increasing militancy… and 
political instability” have contributed to a decline in tourism and foreign direct 
investment.
48
  According to UN Human Development Report 2011 nearly 50% of 
Pakistan’s population is affected by multidimensional poverty
49
, a factor determined by 
health, education and standards of living in households.
50
   
 In order to gain good will towards the United States and President Zardari of 
Pakistan, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy outlines a focus on highly visible and high 
impact projects in conjunction with Pakistan’s government.  A renewed focus on building 
up infrastructure, improving the government’s provision of social services to underserved 
areas and political and economic reforms are all important objectives.  Political and 
economic reform will come through U.S. funneling funding for important projects 
through accountable local and national level Pakistani government agencies.  This will 
                                                        
47 Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan. “Pakistanis Criticize U.S. Action That Killed Osama 
Bin Laden.” Gallup World. 18 May 2011. 
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48 Kronstadt. “Pakistan-US Relations.” p. 31. 
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50 Ibid. p. 172.  
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simultaneously improve public opinion of these agencies, provide funding for necessary 
projects, and make the Pakistani government responsible for the success and life of these 
projects, thus making them more likely to be sustainable in the long-term.
51
 Also in 
pursuit of political and economic reforms the U.S. will provide economic advice and 
assistance and monitor elections while supporting civil society groups to “ensure the 
continuation of elected civilian government and constitutional rule."
52
 
 U.S. cooperation with Pakistan has produced some success in its battle against al-
Qaeda.  Up until recently Pakistan permitted NATO to transport supplies through its 
borders and permitted the use of bases in Baluchistan from which to launch drone 
strikes.
53
  Pakistan has also aided in the captures of al-Qaeda top operatives and leaders 
such as Mohammed Ali Qasim Yaqub, a courier between leaders,
54
 and “Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed, the 9/11 mastermind.”
55
  Ultimately though the consensus is that their 
participation is insufficient to justify the massive amounts of economic and military aid 
provided to them each year by the U.S.  However, without this support the situation could 
potentially be a lot worse.
56
  There is a significant presence of Islamist extremism in the 
country, enough that officials worry that without stabilization of the Pakistan’s economy, 
society and government these elements stand a real chance of gaining traction and 
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control.  Should Islamist extremist take over the concern is they would undo all progress 
at suppressing al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations and further their reach.
57
 
 As such lawmakers are cautious about coming down too harshly on Pakistan’s 
shortcomings and advocate working towards the “counter-terrorism needs… that are 
mutually beneficial between Pakistan and the United States.”
58
  The United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the oversight and implementation of 
EPPA for its effectiveness at accomplishing its stated objectives in February 2011.  It 
concluded that the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report outlined sufficient aims and failed 
in providing plans for operations research, which are used to improve on the instituted 
programs, and did not advise on “projected levels of assistance” on seven of seventeen of 
the Millennium Challenge indicators.
59
  Some of these are vital, such as “natural resource 
management, business start-up, trade policy, and inflation control.”
60
  The report shows 
that the aid appropriated for 2010 as part of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report was 
particularly slow in being disbursed, with $1.5 billion being available, $1.2 billion being 
obligated and only $180 million being disbursed by December 2010. With this being the 
case the GAO determined the full effect of aid for 2010 could not be determined.  They 
recommended even further oversight of the disbursement and the recipient Pakistani 
agencies.
61
  The evidence in the case of Pakistan is inconclusive, leaving the impression 
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that economic assistance here has had a small to moderate effect in providing a stable 
government willing to aid in fighting al-Qaeda.  It has had a greater effect in providing a 
stable government with enough incentive to at least not openly support al-Qaeda and 
other terror organizations, which could be the case if economic support were withdrawn, 





 As U.S. efforts at driving out al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, then Pakistan are more 
successful increasingly the organization has centralized in Yemen under the branch 
known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  The Republic of Yemen is a 
struggling nation politically, economically, environmentally and socially.  There is a real 
risk that AQAP could gain a permanent foothold within Yemen, especially should it 
become a failed state or devolve again into civil war.  U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta stated, “AQAP… still remains dangerous.”
62
 
 The recent effort to double down on economic reform within Yemen rather than 
rely heavily on a military presence within the nation shows promise.  However, there is 
potential that this will end in a situation much like Afghanistan, where so much economic 
aid is required to maintain stability that it is not sustainable to continue.  In order for 
economic incentives to be determined as truly successful they must result in organic 
growth in the economy, a government viewed with legitimacy by its people and 
accomplish the counterterrorism goals necessary to U.S. security. 
 These efforts are ongoing in all three of the nations discussed here.  In 
Afghanistan, the U.S. administration is ready to claim success.
63
  These measures have 
not been successful as of yet, though, they fail in creating sustainable and organic 
economic growth and in engendering a sense of legitimacy in the government.  It is 
possible this will improve over time, but as of now Afghanistan’s economy is not 
sustainable without heavy lifting on the part of donors and the government cannot make it 
through a single election cycle without fraud.  In Pakistan, though the government is 
unstable at times, it holds together and aids in accomplishing U.S. counterterrorism goals.  
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63 Madhani. “Obama.”  
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Some say they do not accomplish enough, but with a population that does not favor U.S. 
efforts and sympathizes with insurgents the government is in fact maintaining legitimacy 
by not pushing too far.  Pakistan is certainly in need of economic assistance, but it can be 
seen as a success in the other two categories.  The incentives provide them with necessary 
aid, they perform the minimum requirements to receive this aid without overly alienating 
parts of their population and though approval ratings are low the coalition government is 
holding together.   
 With efforts in Yemen only having been seriously considered over the last five 
years or so it is too soon to determine the true effectiveness of these tactics within its 
borders.  With the recent political turmoil and transition it will take time to determine 
whether the government earns legitimacy in the eyes of the public and with such 
desperate economic straits it will be years before success can be seen in that category as 
well.  The easiest thing to track now is the government involvement in aiding in 
counterterrorism campaigns.  Thus far the government is cooperating in permitting U.S. 
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